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 During the 1980s, a number of factors contributed to 
increased concerns among many people regarding livestock 
pricing and procurement practices by meatpackers. One major 
contributor was the continued rise in packer concentration for 
fed cattle. Another was the increased use of non-cash market 
procurement methods, commonly called captive supplies. In 
response, Congress appropriated $0.5 million to the Grain 
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) 
of the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1991, man-
dating a study of meatpacking concentration. GIPSA issued a 
request for proposals, had an interagency group review propos-
als received, and contracted six projects to five universities 
(Packers and Stockyards Program). Some projects consisted 
of two or three separate but interrelated components. Some 
components consisted of alternative analytical approaches.
 To support the research, GIPSA, in consultation with 
contractors, collected primary data from meatpacking firms. 
GIPSA sent teams of their employees to the 43 largest steer 
and heifer slaughtering plants to collect data on each transac-
tion of 35 head or more for the period April 5, 1992, to April 3, 
1993. Total transactions numbered 200,616. GIPSA collected 
operating costs and revenue data by mail survey from the same 
43 plants and for the same time period as the transactions 
data. Contractors also conducted mail or telephone surveys 
for some projects.
 Many researchers involved in the GIPSA study have had 
a long history of addressing concentration, pricing, and related 
industry issues. Access to data was better for this study than 
any ever before undertaken. In many cases, data came from 
a broader segment of the industry, covered a longer time 
period, and contained information never before available. In 
short, this was the most thorough work done on these issues 
to date. This author believes the results should not be buried 
or ignored. Much was learned. Certainly the work has limita-
tions, some related to data, time available, and administration 
of the study. Some results surprised the researchers; others 
were very revealing. This Extension Facts attempts to identify 
those findings which are believed to be especially pertinent, 
i.e., findings which will inevitably influence policy decisions 
and industry structure in the future.
Definition of Regional Cattle  
Procurement Markets
 This project consisted of three components (Hayenga, 
Koontz, and Schroeder). For the three components combined, 
there were multiple objectives and multiple approaches. In 
any antitrust matter, one of the first steps is to determine the 
relevant market. Relevant markets are both product markets 
and geographic markets. Properly defining the relevant geo-
graphic market is essential to correctly describing the structure 
and assessing the conduct and performance of an industry.
 One component used publicly available market price data 
over several years to estimate linkages between markets from 
which fed cattle prices are reported. Another used transactions 
data for one year to map the procurement area of packing 
plants and to estimate the responsiveness of packing plants 
to price changes. And the final one used transactions data for 
one year to estimate price leadership among plants, long-run 
spatial price relationships among plants, and the speed of 
price adjustment by plants.
 In the first component, arbitrage costs were estimated 
between price reporting markets. Low costs suggest pairs of 
comparison markets are in the same geographic market, while 
high costs suggest the comparison markets are in separate 
geographic markets. In general, it was found that average 
arbitrage costs were relatively low. Thus, the probability of 
finding arbitrage between market pairs was small. For neigh-
boring markets, arbitrage costs approximated transportation 
costs. This suggests U.S. fed cattle markets for which market 
prices are reported are reasonably well linked. While there 
were no clear market separations, there was some degree of 
market separation on the east and west coasts from markets 
in the central U.S. There was also some separation between 
the southwestern and northwestern markets.
 Geographic mapping of fed cattle purchases from the 
cash market over a year-long period was part of the second 
component. Procurement area mapping indicated that on 
average, plants obtained 64 percent of their fed cattle in the 
U.S. from within 75 miles of the plant, 82 percent from within 
150 miles, and 92 percent from within 250 miles. Ninety-five 
percent of purchases came from within 270 miles of each plant 
on average. However, the average maximum distance from 
which a plant purchased cattle was 655 miles. Differences 
were found for plants located in different regions.
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 Procurement area overlaps were computed as one means 
of estimating the amount of competition among plants. An 
overlap was assumed when at least 10 percent of a plant’s 
fed cattle procurement came from an area where cattle were 
also purchased by one or more other plants. Of the 43 plants 
studied, the fewest number of overlaps was one and the most 
was 22. More overlaps were found among larger plants. Plants 
in the west and east had fewer overlaps than plants in the 
plains and midwestern states.
 In the third component, Granger causality analysis 
revealed strong causality among most plants, with consider-
able information flowing among plants. Plants in Kansas and 
Nebraska tend to be geographic price leaders, regardless of 
whether daily average prices or day-to-day price differences 
were used. Similarly, cointegration results found nearly all 
plants’ prices are cointegrated. On a daily basis, a long-run 
spatial equilibrium price relationship was evident across nearly 
all plants. Prices did not significantly diverge from each other 
across plants. 
 Another approach found that Nebraska tended to be the 
center for price discovery. Plants in Texas and Kansas tend to 
follow prices discovered in Nebraska. Plants in other regions 
had weaker links to prices in Nebraska or other regions. Plants 
in Texas and Kansas react most quickly to price changes 
at plants in Nebraska and Colorado. Rapid adjustments 
by plants suggest those plants are in the same geographic 
market. Plants in Nebraska and other states react slowly to 
price changes in Texas and Kansas. Thus, plants in Texas 
and Kansas generally do not have a rapid influence on daily 
price adjustments in other states.
 Cointegration increased for plants with overlapping 
procurement areas. Plants with overlapping procurement 
areas also are more likely to have significant price causality 
with each other. Plants purchasing a high percentage of their 
slaughter in the cash market are less likely to have prices 
cointegrated with other plants, are slower to adjust to price 
changes elsewhere, and are more likely to have price changes 
at other plants influence their prices. 
 Larger plants have prices that are less likely to be 
cointegrated, respond more slowly to deviations from spatial 
equilibrium, and are less apt to have prices affected by price 
changes at other plants. These results suggest larger plants 
operate somewhat independently relative to smaller plants 
in discovering daily prices. They may operate with greater 
concern for volume needs and high levels of plant utilization 
than for market prices. Plants operated by the same firm were 
more likely to have cointegrated prices. Firms having plants in 
different locations can more easily ship cattle between plant 
locations or purchase cattle from the fringe of each plant’s 
trade area and ship cattle to either plant.
 In summary, regardless of the various approaches and 
data used, general results were quite consistent. A few states, 
primarily Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas represent the core 
geographic market for fed cattle and the center of price dis-
covery. All other cattle feeding areas are linked to this market 
center, but the strength of the linkage diminishes as plants 
are located farther from the core. The weakest linkages and 
areas most likely to comprise a separate geographic market 
are in the eastern and western U.S. Linkages were stronger 
when considering firms rather than plants. 
Price Determination in Slaughter Cattle 
Procurement
 The primary objective of this project was to describe and 
assess the pricing and procurement practices of meatpackers 
(Texas Agricultural Market Research Center). Transactions 
data provided information on what packers’ pricing and pro-
curement practices for fed cattle were, and a survey of pack-
ers and feeders provided insight on why such practices were 
followed. There were two approaches to the what component 
and one to the why component.
 Cash market transactions accounted for 82.3 percent 
of the sale lots; market agreements, 8 percent; forward con-
tracts, 7 percent; and packer-fed transactions, 2.7 percent. 
Live weight pricing was used for 45.6 percent of the transac-
tions; carcass weight, 37.6 percent; and formula prices, 16.8 
percent. Consequently, cash market transactions with pricing 
based on either live weight or carcass weight accounted for 
three-fourths (74.7 percent) of all transactions.
 An average sale lot consisted of 115 head of 1,157-pound 
steers and heifers. A high percentage of sellers (88.8 percent) 
sold less than 1,000 cattle and 74.3 percent of all sellers had 
fewer than 5 transactions during the one-year data period. 
On average, 53.8 percent of the transactions were all steers; 
32.2 percent all heifers; and 5.7 percent dairy (including fed 
Holsteins). The average percentage Choice grade was 57.2 
percent, with 35.2 percent Select cattle. Carcasses in the 
average sale lot were 49.4 percent yield grade 2 and 42.1 
percent yield grade 3. Yield or dressing percentage per sale 
lot averaged 62.6 percent.
 Data were provided by GIPSA on packer capacity. 
From that and the transactions data, capacity utilization was 
estimated. Plant utilization differed widely for larger versus 
smaller firms. The three largest firms had an average daily 
capacity in their plants of 3,026 head and an average capacity 
utilization of 80.4 percent. Comparable figures for the next five 
largest firms were 1,542 head and 72.1 percent, while for the 
remaining, smaller firms, the figures were 451 head and 59.4 
percent. In theory, larger firms which have plants capitalizing 
on economies of size should be able to pay more for fed cattle. 
However, if larger firms are exercising market power, they will 
pay less for fed cattle. Data showed that plants both with larger 
capacity and with higher plant utilization paid higher prices on 
average for fed cattle compared with smaller, less efficiently 
utilized plants. Consequently, efficiency gains were being 
passed back to cattle feeders in the form of higher fed cattle 
prices. There was evidence that as regional concentration 
increased, fed cattle prices declined, but the authors termed 
the magnitude “negligible.” Small price declines were offset 
by higher prices associated with keeping plants operating at 
high rates of capacity utilization.
 Packers also paid higher prices for cattle sold in larger 
sale lots and for cattle sold by larger cattle feeders (feedlot 
capacities of 16,000 head or more). Higher prices were paid 
for marketing agreement cattle compared with cash market 
cattle, while lower prices were paid for forward contracted 
cattle. Higher prices were paid for cattle in the most geographi-
cally concentrated cattle feeding areas, i.e. west north central 
and southern plains states. Packers paid a small premium 
for cattle purchased from within 100 miles of the plant and 
a small discount for cattle purchased from over 300 miles of 
the plant. These results suggest packers are not exercising 
spatial monopsony pricing. Packers paid higher prices for sale 
lots of cattle which were predominantly yield grades 2 and 3, 
and there was evidence that packers preferred uniform sale 
lots.
 Packers and feeders ranked their preferred pricing 
methods similarly with a preference for live weight pricing. 
Packers preferred a longer delivery period than feeders did 
for contract cattle. Packers preferred 30 days or more, while 
feeders preferred 10 days or less. A majority of packers and 
feeders agreed that premiums were paid for higher quality 
cattle. A higher percentage of packers than feeders indicated 
a premium was paid for sorting privileges. Feeders perceived 
that packers discount cattle only for dark cutters and excessive 
mud. Packers agreed to discounting for those factors, along 
with inconsistent quality, high yield grade (i.e., yield grades 4-5), 
large-framed cattle, small -framed cattle, excessive ear/loose 
skin, weighing conditions, and reputation of the cattle.
 Packer and feedlot respondents rated the same three 
feedlot services/characteristics highest in importance in pur-
chase/sale of fed cattle; i.e., honesty, reliability, and dependable 
delivery dates. However, packers rated the first two significantly 
higher than feeders. Packers also rated the following factors 
as more important than feedlots; feed primarily non-Brahman 
cattle, feed mostly steers or feed mostly heifers, and sorting 
pens to finish evenly.
 In summary, in terms of what packers were doing, larger 
and more efficient packers appeared to be passing back some 
of their efficiency gains to feeders in the form of higher prices. 
Larger packers paid higher prices in general. They paid higher 
prices for cattle purchased from the most concentrated feeding 
areas and paid higher prices for cattle purchased closer to 
their plants. Higher prices were paid for fed cattle purchased 
by marketing agreements, while lower prices were paid for 
forward contracted cattle, both relative to cash market cattle. 
As to the why of purchasing/marketing fed cattle, there ap-
peared to be more agreement among packers and feeders 
than disagreement and more than might have been expected 
by many cattlemen and others.
Role of Captive Supplies in Beef Packing
 Three alternatives to cash market purchases include pack-
er feeding, forward contracting, and marketing agreements. 
Combined, these three procurement methods are commonly 
called captive supplies. The captive supplies project consisted 
of two components, one estimating long-run impacts from 
captive supplies and the other estimating short-run impacts 
(Ward et al.). The objective for the long-run component was 
to identify the determinants for packers using contracts and 
marketing agreements. This was the first research attempting to 
measure the factors affecting packers’ use of captive supplies. 
The short-run component consisted of multiple objectives and 
approaches, but the overriding objective was to estimate the 
impacts captive supplies had on cash transaction prices.
 A model was estimated using special captive supply 
survey data for the long-run study to identify those factors 
which affect how much a plant uses contracts and marketing 
agreements for fed cattle procurement. Transactions data 
were used for the short-run impacts study, and three models 
were estimated, each taking a slightly different approach to 
measuring the effects of captive supplies on cash market 
prices. Models focused on the effects deliveries of captive 
supply purchases had on cash prices, impacts an inventory of 
captive supply purchases had on cash prices, and differences 
between prices paid by packers for fed cattle purchased by 
alternative methods, i.e., captive supply methods versus cash 
market purchases. 
 In examining monthly captive supply data collected by 
GIPSA, it was found that forward contracting (including here 
marketing agreement purchases) and packer feeding varied 
greatly among plants. Use of captive supplies was higher for 
larger plants compared with smaller plants. Average monthly 
captive supply purchases were nearly three times higher for 
larger than smaller plants (17,872 and 5,818 head per month, 
respectively, across all plants). Larger plants also had higher 
plant utilization than smaller plants. Use of packer feeding was 
relatively constant during the year, whereas use of forward 
contracts and marketing agreements was more variable, 
increasing in April, June, and December. 
 The captive supply determinant model found that larger 
plants use captive supplies strategically. Captive supply usage 
increased as cash prices increased for larger plants but not 
smaller plants. Captive supply usage increased as cash price 
variability increased, moreso for larger plants than smaller 
plants. Captive supply usage also increased as plant utilization 
increased. Lastly, for larger plants, contracting and marketing 
agreements were substitutes for packer feeding. Therefore, 
in summary, larger plants used captive supplies to increase 
plant utilization and to mitigate rising or more variable prices. 
Cattle availability over the five-year data period did not affect 
captive supply levels.
 No previous research recognized that decisions by pack-
ers to use captive supplies are made simultaneously with 
decisions of whether to purchase cattle in the cash market 
and how much to pay for cash market cattle. In one of the 
short-term impact approaches, simultaneity was found in the 
decision to deliver forward contracted and marketing agree-
ment cattle and the decision to purchase cash market cattle. 
The same simultaneity was not found for packer fed cattle. This 
suggests packers feed cattle for different reasons than they 
use for contracts and marketing agreements. Packer feeding 
may be motivated more by cattle feeding profit opportunities 
and maintaining a steady flow of cattle to the plant, and less 
by using packer fed cattle strategically to reduce procurement 
costs via its influence on cash market prices. As the percent-
age delivery from the inventory of forward contracted cattle 
increased by one percent (from the average for the year), 
transaction prices were found to decline by $0.03-$0.05/cwt. 
(dressed weight prices). The range of price effects corresponds 
to several modeling approaches. Captive supply inventory 
periods of 14 days and 28 days were considered, and some 
models included variables for plants, while others used firms. A 
consistent negative relationship was also found for marketing 
agreement cattle. As the percentage delivery from the inventory 
of marketing agreement cattle increased one percent, cash 
market transaction prices declined by $0.10-$0.41/cwt.
 Another approach measured the impacts between the 
size of captive supply inventory and level of transaction 
prices. Results again were mixed. For the total inventory of 
captive supply cattle, results were consistently negative but 
small. Cash market transaction prices declined by $0.01/cwt. 
or less as the inventory of captive supply cattle increased by 
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1,000 head from the average quantity for the year. For forward 
contracted cattle, the cash market impacts were consistently 
positive; for packer fed cattle, the impacts were mixed; and 
for marketing agreement cattle, the impacts were consistently 
negative but small ($0.01-$0.04/cwt.).
 This study was the first to compare prices paid by packers 
among fed cattle procurement methods. Importantly, price dif-
ferences were found among procurement methods. Compared 
with cash market prices, packers paid $3.02-$3.16/cwt. less 
(dressed weight prices) for forward contracted cattle over the 
one-year period. Packer-fed prices were about the same as 
cash market prices and prices paid by packers for marketing 
agreement cattle were $0.07-$0.10/cwt. higher than for cash 
market prices. These results suggest cattle feeders pay a 
risk premium to packers for forward contracting cattle. And 
while not large, the higher marketing agreement prices may 
suggest that packers provide a small incentive to feeders for 
the higher quality or quantity of fed cattle they purchase via 
marketing agreements.
 Modeling results confirmed much prior research as well as 
research from other projects of the GIPSA study. For example, 
substantial price differences were found among packing plants 
and firms. Highest prices were found in general for plants in 
the Kansas area, though not corresponding to state boundar-
ies. Compared to a base plant, plants in or near Kansas paid 
about $0.36/cwt. higher prices on average. Prices tended 
to decline as plant locations increased in distance from that 
core area. Prices were about $0.90/cwt. lower on average for 
plants located in an area bounded by South Dakota, Colorado, 
the northern half of Texas, and Missouri. Prices were about 
$2.63/cwt. lower on average for plants located outside that 
bounded area. These results corresponded to findings in the 
regional market definition component of the GIPSA study. 
 In summary, larger plants made greater use of captive 
supply procurement methods to keep plant utilization high. 
Larger plants tended to use captive supplies strategically, i.e., 
increasing the use of captive supplies as cash market prices 
and price variability increased. Decisions to deliver cattle from 
an inventory of purchased cattle by captive supply methods 
and decisions to purchase cash market cattle were interrelated 
for marketing agreement and forward contract cattle. Price 
impacts from captive supplies were often negative, though 
small. A large price difference was found between forward 
contracted cattle and cash market purchases. Plants in the 
vicinity of Kansas, not necessarily corresponding to the state’s 
boundaries, paid highest prices for fed cattle, similar to find-
ings in the regional market definition and price determination 
projects of this study.
Effects of Concentration on Prices Paid 
for Cattle
 For many producers and others, the expected results 
from this portion of the GIPSA study were clear; concentra-
tion impacts on fed cattle prices would be large and negative. 
However, no concrete conclusions about the effects of concen-
tration on fed cattle prices were made (Kambhampaty et al.). 
Data limitations hampered the analysis more for this project 
than others. Cost and revenue data were collected by mail 
survey and data were sometimes not available or data were 
not kept uniformly across packers. Follow up phone contact 
by P&SP failed to resolve many of the problems.
 This project was the first attempt to estimate packer 
concentration impacts with detailed weekly and monthly cost 
and revenue data from packers for individual plants. Most 
previous attempts used aggregated time series data. Previ-
ous research indicated data aggregation harmed efforts to 
estimate market power by a widely employed methodology. 
Therefore, the opportunity to test for market power with weekly 
data was welcomed. However, imprecise and inaccurate cost 
and revenue data hampered the ability to draw definitive 
conclusions.
 A model was developed to test whether packers attempted 
to maximize profits, both for packers that slaughter only and 
packers that slaughter and fabricate. Results suggest packers 
are not strict short-term profit maximizing firms. Deviations 
from profit-maximizing output levels occurred as frequently 
as 16 percent of the time for some plants. Packers are appar-
ently constrained by contractual and labor commitments to 
such an extent that they do not choose weekly periods over 
which to maximize profits.
 In summary, more information is needed regarding packer 
behavior. Goals of packers, if not strict profit maximization, 
need to be better understood to identify better means of es-
timating packer concentration impacts on fed cattle prices. 
This finding was deemed to be very important since strict profit 
maximization is an underlying assumption for methodology 
estimating market power. Thus, more emphasis needs to 
be placed on understanding and analyzing firm behavior in 
imperfect markets.
Vertical Coordination in Hog Production
 This project was the only one dealing exclusively with 
hogs (Hayenga et al.). It focused on the largest packers, feed 
companies, and hog producers/contractors. Its objectives were 
to identify and estimate the relative importance of current 
vertical coordination arrangements, determine projections 
for vertical coordination changes, and identify implications 
from those changes.
 Nineteen of the largest pork packing firms purchased 
about 87 percent of their hogs from the cash market in 1993. 
Nearly 11 of the remaining 13 percent were supplied by long-
term contracts. Changes expected in the next five years are 
noteworthy. Purchases from the cash market are expected to 
decline from 87 to 66 percent by 1998. Conversely, long-term 
contracts are expected to increase from 11 to 25 percent in 
the same five-year period. The sharp reduction in use of cash 
markets has clear implications for price discovery and price 
reporting. Fewer prices will be publicly available to report and 
be used in discovering contract prices. However, if nearly 
two-thirds of hogs marketed still are purchased in the cash 
market, price discovery may not be hampered significantly.
 Many long-term marketing contracts were formal, written 
contracts for a fixed time period (often four to seven years). 
Half of the packers involved in long-term contracts reported 
requiring a minimum number of hogs and either a minimum 
quality or specified genetics. The dominant pricing arrange-
ment was a formula price consisting of a base price tied to a 
reported market price and carcass merit adjustments based 
on cutout value of the hogs. Some innovative risk-sharing 
contracts were found. The two most important reasons for 
long-term contracts were improved quality and reduced 
quality risks. More advantages of long-term contracts were 
mentioned by packers than disadvantages. Financial benefits 
to hog producers, either increased capital availability or lower 
financial risk, were cited most often as the primary advantages. 
The most frequently mentioned disadvantage for producers in 
the view of packers was reduced flexibility. Not surprisingly, 
given the above, the largest packers expect closer producer-
packer linkages in the next five years.
 The largest hog producers expect to increase produc-
tion from the 1993 level of 13 million head to 30 million head 
by 1998, an increase of 144 percent. Nearly three-fourths of 
the hogs they marketed in 1993 were contracted to packers. 
Larger producers also expect closer ties with packers in the 
future. By 1998, they expect to market only 10 percent of their 
hogs in the cash market. A larger percentage of hogs in 1998 
than in 1993 is expected to be produced by packers or in joint 
ventures with packers, but forward contracts will comprise 
nearly three-fourths of expected marketings.
 Large hog producers cited a guaranteed market outlet as 
the primary benefit from forward contracts. Reduced market 
risk was second, followed by a tie between better prices and 
reduced transaction costs. Producers verified what packers 
indicated about disadvantages of contracts. Producers cited 
the inability to shop for better prices as the biggest limiting 
factor surrounding contracts. Producers cited the assurance of 
hog supplies as the most important benefit to packers. Lower 
buying costs and better quality hogs ranked second and third. 
Relatively few disadvantages for packers were mentioned by 
producers. Nearly 80 percent of the largest hog producers 
were involved in hog production contracting of a type similar 
to the broiler industry. Besides closer ties with packers in the 
future, large hog producers anticipate a reduced role in hog 
production by commercial feed companies, though large feed 
companies anticipated a slightly larger role in hog produc-
tion.
 Survey results indicated large packers contract with large 
hog producers. Most contracts were not fixed price contracts, 
thus not transferring price risk from hog producers to pack-
ers. The primary motivation for long-term contracting was a 
guaranteed outlet, especially among those hog producers 
marketing a half million hogs or more annually. Those largest 
producers can account for a substantial percentage of daily 
slaughter for many packing plants. Long-term contracts also 
reduce transactions costs for producers and packers and aid 
quality improvement over time.
 In summary, larger hog producers expect to continue their 
rapid growth rate in the next five years. They expect closer 
relationships with packers and less reliance on cash market 
prices. Price discovery concerns which have plagued the beef 
industry the past couple years may simply be preceding simi-
lar price discovery concerns in the hog industry. Contracting 
has advantages for both buyers and sellers, from financing 
hog production to guaranteeing supplies to operating larger 
slaughter plants more efficiently. Reasons for using marketing 
contracts in hogs parallel those found for fed cattle.
Assessing Competition in Meatpacking: 
Economic History, Theory, and Evidence
 All projects of the GIPSA study contribute to future re-
search regarding issues related to packer competition and 
pricing. This project (Azzam and Anderson) was specifically 
intended to review an extensive literature pertaining to the 
meatpacking industry and its relative competitiveness. The 
historical development of the packing industry is discussed 
prior to reviewing the economic theories and methods related 
to assessing the competitiveness or noncompetitiveness of 
the industry.
 Ultimately, the report attempts to determine whether the 
empirical evidence is persuasive enough to conclude that 
competition in the packing industry is deficient. Limitations 
with each of the two major approaches to studying industry 
competition are reviewed. The structure-conduct performance 
(SCP) approach attempts to link industry structure, such as 
number, size, location, and concentration of firms, with industry 
performance, such as prices paid and received, innovative-
ness, and profitability. The new empirical industrial organiza-
tion (NEIO) approach attempts to focus more on conduct of 
firms in the industry. A major limitation of the SCP approach 
often relates to alternative interpretations or explanations of 
empirical results. Major limitations of the NEIO approach often 
pertain to inadequate data; thus they rely more on aggregated 
data over time and/or space.
 While each approach has limitations, numerous studies 
undertaken to date make a contribution. In total, the authors 
conclude that the body of empirical evidence is not persuasive 
enough to conclude the industry is noncompetitive. However, 
failure to prove the industry is noncompetitive is also not 
persuasive enough to conclude the industry is competitive.
 In summary, empirical research to date fails to show con-
clusively that the packing industry is noncompetitive. A pattern 
of growth and innovation in the packing industry is evident. In 
the lone study attempting to measure cost efficiency gains in 
meatpacking vs. market power losses, results suggest cost 
efficiency gains from economies of size outweighed market 
power losses from the decline in competitiveness. The question 
is raised whether or not the static, textbook theory of perfect 
competition is really the appropriate benchmark in a dynamic 
real-world market. Textbook theories clearly show misalloca-
tion of resources in static, imperfectly competitive markets. 
However, there is evidence that imperfectly competitive markets 
may achieve greater efficiencies over time through growth 
and innovation. Therefore, the authors conclude that policies 
steering the packing industry toward rivalrous behavior are 
preferable to policies that attempt to ensure a specific market 
structure, i.e., number, size, and location of firms or level of 
concentration. As with the conclusion from the concentration 
project, future research should focus on meatpacker behav-
ior.
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1,000 head from the average quantity for the year. For forward 
contracted cattle, the cash market impacts were consistently 
positive; for packer fed cattle, the impacts were mixed; and 
for marketing agreement cattle, the impacts were consistently 
negative but small ($0.01-$0.04/cwt.).
 This study was the first to compare prices paid by packers 
among fed cattle procurement methods. Importantly, price dif-
ferences were found among procurement methods. Compared 
with cash market prices, packers paid $3.02-$3.16/cwt. less 
(dressed weight prices) for forward contracted cattle over the 
one-year period. Packer-fed prices were about the same as 
cash market prices and prices paid by packers for marketing 
agreement cattle were $0.07-$0.10/cwt. higher than for cash 
market prices. These results suggest cattle feeders pay a 
risk premium to packers for forward contracting cattle. And 
while not large, the higher marketing agreement prices may 
suggest that packers provide a small incentive to feeders for 
the higher quality or quantity of fed cattle they purchase via 
marketing agreements.
 Modeling results confirmed much prior research as well as 
research from other projects of the GIPSA study. For example, 
substantial price differences were found among packing plants 
and firms. Highest prices were found in general for plants in 
the Kansas area, though not corresponding to state boundar-
ies. Compared to a base plant, plants in or near Kansas paid 
about $0.36/cwt. higher prices on average. Prices tended 
to decline as plant locations increased in distance from that 
core area. Prices were about $0.90/cwt. lower on average for 
plants located in an area bounded by South Dakota, Colorado, 
the northern half of Texas, and Missouri. Prices were about 
$2.63/cwt. lower on average for plants located outside that 
bounded area. These results corresponded to findings in the 
regional market definition component of the GIPSA study. 
 In summary, larger plants made greater use of captive 
supply procurement methods to keep plant utilization high. 
Larger plants tended to use captive supplies strategically, i.e., 
increasing the use of captive supplies as cash market prices 
and price variability increased. Decisions to deliver cattle from 
an inventory of purchased cattle by captive supply methods 
and decisions to purchase cash market cattle were interrelated 
for marketing agreement and forward contract cattle. Price 
impacts from captive supplies were often negative, though 
small. A large price difference was found between forward 
contracted cattle and cash market purchases. Plants in the 
vicinity of Kansas, not necessarily corresponding to the state’s 
boundaries, paid highest prices for fed cattle, similar to find-
ings in the regional market definition and price determination 
projects of this study.
Effects of Concentration on Prices Paid 
for Cattle
 For many producers and others, the expected results 
from this portion of the GIPSA study were clear; concentra-
tion impacts on fed cattle prices would be large and negative. 
However, no concrete conclusions about the effects of concen-
tration on fed cattle prices were made (Kambhampaty et al.). 
Data limitations hampered the analysis more for this project 
than others. Cost and revenue data were collected by mail 
survey and data were sometimes not available or data were 
not kept uniformly across packers. Follow up phone contact 
by P&SP failed to resolve many of the problems.
 This project was the first attempt to estimate packer 
concentration impacts with detailed weekly and monthly cost 
and revenue data from packers for individual plants. Most 
previous attempts used aggregated time series data. Previ-
ous research indicated data aggregation harmed efforts to 
estimate market power by a widely employed methodology. 
Therefore, the opportunity to test for market power with weekly 
data was welcomed. However, imprecise and inaccurate cost 
and revenue data hampered the ability to draw definitive 
conclusions.
 A model was developed to test whether packers attempted 
to maximize profits, both for packers that slaughter only and 
packers that slaughter and fabricate. Results suggest packers 
are not strict short-term profit maximizing firms. Deviations 
from profit-maximizing output levels occurred as frequently 
as 16 percent of the time for some plants. Packers are appar-
ently constrained by contractual and labor commitments to 
such an extent that they do not choose weekly periods over 
which to maximize profits.
 In summary, more information is needed regarding packer 
behavior. Goals of packers, if not strict profit maximization, 
need to be better understood to identify better means of es-
timating packer concentration impacts on fed cattle prices. 
This finding was deemed to be very important since strict profit 
maximization is an underlying assumption for methodology 
estimating market power. Thus, more emphasis needs to 
be placed on understanding and analyzing firm behavior in 
imperfect markets.
Vertical Coordination in Hog Production
 This project was the only one dealing exclusively with 
hogs (Hayenga et al.). It focused on the largest packers, feed 
companies, and hog producers/contractors. Its objectives were 
to identify and estimate the relative importance of current 
vertical coordination arrangements, determine projections 
for vertical coordination changes, and identify implications 
from those changes.
 Nineteen of the largest pork packing firms purchased 
about 87 percent of their hogs from the cash market in 1993. 
Nearly 11 of the remaining 13 percent were supplied by long-
term contracts. Changes expected in the next five years are 
noteworthy. Purchases from the cash market are expected to 
decline from 87 to 66 percent by 1998. Conversely, long-term 
contracts are expected to increase from 11 to 25 percent in 
the same five-year period. The sharp reduction in use of cash 
markets has clear implications for price discovery and price 
reporting. Fewer prices will be publicly available to report and 
be used in discovering contract prices. However, if nearly 
two-thirds of hogs marketed still are purchased in the cash 
market, price discovery may not be hampered significantly.
 Many long-term marketing contracts were formal, written 
contracts for a fixed time period (often four to seven years). 
Half of the packers involved in long-term contracts reported 
requiring a minimum number of hogs and either a minimum 
quality or specified genetics. The dominant pricing arrange-
ment was a formula price consisting of a base price tied to a 
reported market price and carcass merit adjustments based 
on cutout value of the hogs. Some innovative risk-sharing 
contracts were found. The two most important reasons for 
long-term contracts were improved quality and reduced 
quality risks. More advantages of long-term contracts were 
mentioned by packers than disadvantages. Financial benefits 
to hog producers, either increased capital availability or lower 
financial risk, were cited most often as the primary advantages. 
The most frequently mentioned disadvantage for producers in 
the view of packers was reduced flexibility. Not surprisingly, 
given the above, the largest packers expect closer producer-
packer linkages in the next five years.
 The largest hog producers expect to increase produc-
tion from the 1993 level of 13 million head to 30 million head 
by 1998, an increase of 144 percent. Nearly three-fourths of 
the hogs they marketed in 1993 were contracted to packers. 
Larger producers also expect closer ties with packers in the 
future. By 1998, they expect to market only 10 percent of their 
hogs in the cash market. A larger percentage of hogs in 1998 
than in 1993 is expected to be produced by packers or in joint 
ventures with packers, but forward contracts will comprise 
nearly three-fourths of expected marketings.
 Large hog producers cited a guaranteed market outlet as 
the primary benefit from forward contracts. Reduced market 
risk was second, followed by a tie between better prices and 
reduced transaction costs. Producers verified what packers 
indicated about disadvantages of contracts. Producers cited 
the inability to shop for better prices as the biggest limiting 
factor surrounding contracts. Producers cited the assurance of 
hog supplies as the most important benefit to packers. Lower 
buying costs and better quality hogs ranked second and third. 
Relatively few disadvantages for packers were mentioned by 
producers. Nearly 80 percent of the largest hog producers 
were involved in hog production contracting of a type similar 
to the broiler industry. Besides closer ties with packers in the 
future, large hog producers anticipate a reduced role in hog 
production by commercial feed companies, though large feed 
companies anticipated a slightly larger role in hog produc-
tion.
 Survey results indicated large packers contract with large 
hog producers. Most contracts were not fixed price contracts, 
thus not transferring price risk from hog producers to pack-
ers. The primary motivation for long-term contracting was a 
guaranteed outlet, especially among those hog producers 
marketing a half million hogs or more annually. Those largest 
producers can account for a substantial percentage of daily 
slaughter for many packing plants. Long-term contracts also 
reduce transactions costs for producers and packers and aid 
quality improvement over time.
 In summary, larger hog producers expect to continue their 
rapid growth rate in the next five years. They expect closer 
relationships with packers and less reliance on cash market 
prices. Price discovery concerns which have plagued the beef 
industry the past couple years may simply be preceding simi-
lar price discovery concerns in the hog industry. Contracting 
has advantages for both buyers and sellers, from financing 
hog production to guaranteeing supplies to operating larger 
slaughter plants more efficiently. Reasons for using marketing 
contracts in hogs parallel those found for fed cattle.
Assessing Competition in Meatpacking: 
Economic History, Theory, and Evidence
 All projects of the GIPSA study contribute to future re-
search regarding issues related to packer competition and 
pricing. This project (Azzam and Anderson) was specifically 
intended to review an extensive literature pertaining to the 
meatpacking industry and its relative competitiveness. The 
historical development of the packing industry is discussed 
prior to reviewing the economic theories and methods related 
to assessing the competitiveness or noncompetitiveness of 
the industry.
 Ultimately, the report attempts to determine whether the 
empirical evidence is persuasive enough to conclude that 
competition in the packing industry is deficient. Limitations 
with each of the two major approaches to studying industry 
competition are reviewed. The structure-conduct performance 
(SCP) approach attempts to link industry structure, such as 
number, size, location, and concentration of firms, with industry 
performance, such as prices paid and received, innovative-
ness, and profitability. The new empirical industrial organiza-
tion (NEIO) approach attempts to focus more on conduct of 
firms in the industry. A major limitation of the SCP approach 
often relates to alternative interpretations or explanations of 
empirical results. Major limitations of the NEIO approach often 
pertain to inadequate data; thus they rely more on aggregated 
data over time and/or space.
 While each approach has limitations, numerous studies 
undertaken to date make a contribution. In total, the authors 
conclude that the body of empirical evidence is not persuasive 
enough to conclude the industry is noncompetitive. However, 
failure to prove the industry is noncompetitive is also not 
persuasive enough to conclude the industry is competitive.
 In summary, empirical research to date fails to show con-
clusively that the packing industry is noncompetitive. A pattern 
of growth and innovation in the packing industry is evident. In 
the lone study attempting to measure cost efficiency gains in 
meatpacking vs. market power losses, results suggest cost 
efficiency gains from economies of size outweighed market 
power losses from the decline in competitiveness. The question 
is raised whether or not the static, textbook theory of perfect 
competition is really the appropriate benchmark in a dynamic 
real-world market. Textbook theories clearly show misalloca-
tion of resources in static, imperfectly competitive markets. 
However, there is evidence that imperfectly competitive markets 
may achieve greater efficiencies over time through growth 
and innovation. Therefore, the authors conclude that policies 
steering the packing industry toward rivalrous behavior are 
preferable to policies that attempt to ensure a specific market 
structure, i.e., number, size, and location of firms or level of 
concentration. As with the conclusion from the concentration 




 A number of findings from the six projects of this study 
were consistent. A few major cattle feeding states, primarily 
Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas represent the core geographic 
market for fed cattle and the center of price discovery. All 
other cattle feeding areas are linked to this market center, but 
the strength of the linkage diminishes as plants are located 
farther from the core. Highest prices for fed cattle are paid in 
the core geographic area. 
 Larger and more efficient packers appeared to be passing 
back some of their efficiency gains to feeders. Higher prices 
were paid for larger sale lots of fed cattle and to the largest 
feedlots. Higher prices were paid by larger packers which had 
larger slaughter capacities and higher rates of plant utilization. 
Higher prices were paid for cattle purchased closer to their 
plants. Higher prices were paid for marketing agreement cattle 
but lower prices were paid for contract cattle, both relative to 
cash market cattle.
 Larger plants made greater use of captive supply pro-
curement methods to keep plant utilization high. Larger plants 
tended to use captive supplies more when cash market prices 
were increasing or when price variability increased. Deci-
sions to deliver cattle from an inventory of purchased cattle 
by captive supply methods and decisions to purchase cash 
market cattle were interrelated for marketing agreement and 
forward contract cattle. Price impacts from captive supplies 
were small, though often negative. A large price difference 
was found between forward contracted cattle and cash market 
purchases.
 The hog industry appears to be following some of the 
trends of the past several years in the fed cattle industry. For 
example, larger hog producers expect to continue their rapid 
growth rate. Closer ties with packers and less reliance on cash 
market prices are expected, which can be interpreted as more 
captive supplies in the hog industry and more concerns about 
price discovery in the next few years. But as with fed cattle, 
hog contracting has advantages for both buyers and sellers, 
from financing hog production to guaranteeing supplies to 
operating larger slaughter plants more efficiently. 
 Empirical research in this study coincides with the as-
sessment of previous empirical research. Research fails to 
show conclusively that the packing industry is noncompetitive, 
and there is evidence of efficiency gains through growth and 
innovation in the packing industry.
 Did this study find negative effects from concentration? 
No. Did this study exonerate packers from questions about 
use and abuse of market power? No. Questions remain. 
Should the static, textbook theory of perfect competition be 
the benchmark for assessing competitiveness in a dynamic 
real-world market? How many resources should be devoted 
to further understanding the conduct or behavior of large 
firms in a concentrated, imperfectly competitive market? How 
many resources should be devoted by regulatory agencies to 
monitoring market performance? These and other questions 
were not and could not be answered by the GIPSA study. 
In this author’s opinion, contributing to a growing body of 
knowledge regarding competitiveness in the packing industry 
is important, and the GIPSA study contributed importantly 
both to the research literature and policy making process.
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